Optimizely’s A/B-Testing Code Served a Card Skimmer on the Websites of 178 Organizations
For most of Monday, the A/B-testing script that Optimizely serves to big websites carried malware that stole card details and swapped cryptocurrency addresses.
Updated 17 November 2026: Optimizely has confirmed the attack and says it fixed the hole the attacker used. Security researcher Scott Helme’s company, Report URI, counted 178 affected organizations, among them Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce and HSBC. Every file we had found infected was clean when we checked again this morning. We’ve corrected the start time, the iPhone advice and the advice for site owners below.
On Monday evening we downloaded the Optimizely files used by ten well-known websites. Six of them contained an added line that pulled in a script from a domain registered at 05:23 UTC that morning: Optimizely’s own website, Virgin Media, O2, TalkTalk, NOW TV and CNN. The four others were clean.
The problem first surfaced at 20:27 UTC, when Neil Craig, a lead architect at the BBC, warned on Mastodon that some of Optimizely’s JavaScript “now includes malware” and credited Helme with spotting it. When we first published, no major outlet had reported it, and Optimizely’s status page listed only an unrelated outage.
If you bought something or signed in on one of these sites on 16 November, read chapter 4.
What We Found
Optimizely Web Experimentation works through one JavaScript file per customer, served from cdn.optimizely.com. The file holds the customer’s tests plus any custom code the customer adds as “Project JavaScript”, and it runs on every page where the site includes it.
In the infected files, the last line of that custom code was the same one-liner. It created a script tag that loaded https://1688360.cc/track.js. CNN’s file had a second copy that hid the address in Base64, and TalkTalk’s carried a longer loader with extra code built in. According to the domain registry data, 1688360.cc was registered on 16 November at 05:23 UTC.
Ten files were all we could check on Monday night. Report URI went much wider. Its team fetched 1,611 Optimizely files and found the code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organizations, and published the full list with a timeline. Banks and finance companies make up the largest group, 32 of them. BleepingComputer found it on Fox News, KLM, GitLab and Smartsheet, among others. Report URI expects the real number to be higher, because it could only check the files it found in time.
What the Malicious Script Does
We downloaded track.js and read it as text; we didn’t run it. It is about 30 KB of plain, commented JavaScript, and it does three things in the visitor’s browser.
It steals payment card details. It watches every form the page submits and every POST request the page sends, looks for a card number that passes the checksum used by real cards, plus an expiry date and a security code, and sends them to 1688360.cc/card.php. Card fields that a payment provider shows inside its own frame (Stripe, Adyen and similar) are a separate page the script can’t read, so the risk is highest where a site collects card numbers in its own form. According to Report URI, this part was only added at 13:43 UTC.
It swaps cryptocurrency addresses. Every 50 milliseconds it scans the page, input fields, links and the clipboard for wallet addresses (Bitcoin, Ethereum, Tron, Solana, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, Dogecoin and TON) and replaces them with the attacker’s. When you copy an address, the one that lands in your clipboard is theirs. The first time it swaps something, it takes a screenshot of the page and sends it to 1688360.cc/hit.php together with the page address and the site’s cookies.
It attacks iPhones and iPads. On Apple mobile devices it loads scripts from two other domains, which pick an exploit chain by iOS version. We didn’t analyse that part; Report URI did. It identified Coruna for iOS 13 to 17 and DarkSword for iOS 18, two known exploit kits, while on iOS 26 the code only fingerprinted the device. We had guessed at the link to the iPhone exploit kits behind the hacked ads on Dutch news sites on Monday; that guess now looks right. On iOS 18.6 or older, an infected page reloads itself every 60 seconds to try again, which you may have noticed.
Who Is Affected
Anyone who opened a page with an infected Optimizely file while it was live, on any of the 178 organizations’ sites.
We wrote on Monday that visits before 05:23 UTC couldn’t have been affected. That was wrong. Report URI saw the first injection at 04:21 UTC, in the BBC’s file, loading code from another attacker domain, webshell.lol. The crypto swapper appeared on sites from 08:28 UTC and the card skimmer from 13:43 UTC. Most files were cleaned between about 20:40 and 21:10 UTC, and from 23:11 UTC Report URI found none still infected.
The same attacker had already tried a different route. From 13 November, Report URI saw the webshell.lol code injected through three other third-party scripts (Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media) on sites such as faz.net, smh.com.au and foxsports.com.
What You Should Do
If you paid by card on one of these sites on 16 November, especially after 13:43 UTC (1:43 pm in London), call your bank or card issuer, tell them the card may have been skimmed, and ask for a new card. Until it arrives, check your statement for small test charges, which often come first.
If you sent cryptocurrency after copying an address on a website that day, compare the address in your wallet with the one the recipient gave you through another channel, such as an email or chat. A transaction to the wrong address can’t be reversed.
If you were signed in to one of these sites, sign out and sign in again. On most sites that ends the old session, so stolen cookies stop working. Changing your password does no harm either.
On an iPhone or iPad, install the latest update (Settings › General › Software Update). The exploit kits’ own code treats iOS 18.7.3 and later, and iOS 26.3 and later, as patched, according to Report URI. If you’re on an older version and visited an affected site that day, updating is the one thing worth doing today.
What Site Owners Should Do
Optimizely says it has removed the injected code and notified the customers whose projects were hit. Check anyway. Open your project’s JavaScript and every experiment’s custom code, and look for 1688360.cc, atob( and any code nobody on your team wrote. Then review who and what can write to your Optimizely account (users, API tokens, integrations) and rotate their credentials.
If card numbers pass through your own pages, treat cards entered on 16 November as possibly exposed: this is a possible card-data breach, and your payment processor will want to hear about it. PCI DSS has required merchants since March 2025 to keep an inventory of every script on their payment pages and to watch them for unauthorised changes. Optimizely files are exactly the sort of script those rules were written for.
A Content Security Policy made the difference on some sites. According to Report URI, 24 sites whose policy listed only the script hosts they needed blocked track.js outright, and 17 more stopped the card, cookie and screenshot theft by limiting where the page could send data. One setting undid the protection: 'unsafe-eval', which, Report URI notes, Optimizely’s own documentation tells customers to allow. It let the inline copy of the payload run at HSBC even though HSBC’s policy blocked the download.
Every third-party script on a checkout page is a spare key to the shop. Most days nobody tries it.
What Optimizely Says and What We Still Don't Know
Optimizely posted a notice on its status page at 01:02 UTC on 17 November. It says an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely’s Experimentation product to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects, and that it has fixed the vulnerability, removed the code, secured the affected user accounts and added protections against unauthorized code. To BleepingComputer it named the weak spot: the Experimentation account signup flow. It also said it ended active sessions, revoked tokens and blocked delivery of the code at Cloudflare. Salesforce told the same outlet it has switched off Optimizely scripts on its sites as a precaution.
The attacker’s main server is gone. 1688360.cc was put on hold at 00:37 UTC on 17 November and no longer resolves, Report URI says. Report URI counted about $7,150 in crypto paid to the attacker’s wallets, which were emptied early on Tuesday. Some of that may predate this attack: one of the wallets has been in use since March 2026.
It’s Optimizely’s second security incident this year. In February it confirmed that an intruder had got into some internal systems, including Zendesk and records in its Salesforce CRM, and reached business contact details. It told BleepingComputer at the time that the way in was a voice-phishing attack. Nothing published so far links the two.
What we still don’t know: how a bug in the signup flow gave someone write access to existing customers’ projects, how many cards, cookies and screenshots reached the attacker, and how many iPhones and iPads were hit. Report URI can’t see those either.
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