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modified eCommerce Hacked: Malicious Code in Its News Feed Reached Online Shops’ Admin Areas

Published

Miklos Zoltan

By Miklos Zoltan

Founder - PrivacyAffairs

Laura Bede

Fact-Checked this

Attackers broke into the project behind modified eCommerce, a free shop system used mostly by small online shops in Germany, and used its news feed to reach those shops’ admin areas.

For 95 minutes on Sunday, 15 November, from 14:24 to 15:59 German time (13:24 to 14:59 UTC), malicious code sat in that feed. The project now says that any shop whose admin area someone logged into during that window counts as compromised. Its forum, wiki, service shop and demo shops are offline.

The warning is on an info page that has replaced the project’s website, last updated at 12:13 German time on 17 November. When we published, one Mastodon post had shared it. We found no news coverage in English or German.

If you run a modified shop, the checklist is in chapter 3. If you buy from small German online shops, chapter 4 is for you.

What the modified Team Has Said

According to the notice, the attackers got in through a security hole in MediaWiki, the software that runs the project’s wiki. From there they reached the forum, the wiki and the service shop where the team sells templates and modules.

The step that matters for shop owners came next. The attackers slipped code into the project’s news feed. Every modified shop downloads that feed into its admin area and saves it in its own database, so the code didn’t stay on the project’s servers. It landed in the shops.

The notice also says:

  • forum users’ email addresses are affected, as far as the team knows now, and those users will get an email
  • there’s no sign so far of a hole in the shop software itself, which the team is still checking
  • security fixes are available for every shop version from 1.06 to 3.3.0
  • the affected systems stay offline until they’ve been checked and secured

Plenty is missing. The notice doesn’t name the MediaWiki flaw, say what the injected code did, or estimate how many shops downloaded it. It tells forum users to change their forum password wherever else they used it, yet lists only email addresses as exposed.

The timing doesn’t make it simpler. On 12 November, three days before the feed was poisoned, the team had already released an emergency security package for all shop versions after confirmed attacks on older ones. Its installation notes list fixes such as escaping customer data shown in admin pages, print pages and emails. The incident notice doesn’t say whether the two events are linked.

How a News Feed Got Into the Admin Area

We read the shop’s code on GitHub (latest commit 13 November) and the fix package the team offers on its info page. Both handle the feed the same way.

When someone opens a shop’s admin area, the shop asks the project’s server, api.modified-shop.org, for news, at most once a day. It writes the items into a database table called newsfeed. The admin start page then prints the title and text of the latest ten items straight into the page as HTML, without escaping them (lines 413 and 417 of admin/start.php). The separate News page in the admin area does the same.

That’s the opening the attackers needed. A news item with a script in it runs in the browser of whoever is logged in, with that person’s admin rights. And because the item stays in the table, it runs again every time the start page opens, which is why the team tells shop owners to empty the table before they log in again.

What can a script do with an admin’s session? Whatever the admin can. In modified, that includes creating admin accounts, changing the shop’s email addresses and editing payment settings. The EU-Standard Bank Transfer module, for example, stores the recipient, bank, IBAN and BIC that customers see when they pay in advance. Those are the same things the team asks shop owners to check, so its checklist reads like a description of what the code was after. That’s our reading; the team hasn’t said what the code did.

One detail worries us more than the 95 minutes. The security package changes admin/start.php in every shop version, but in the 3.3.0 folder the news block still prints the feed as raw HTML. The feed server was answering again on the evening of 17 November, with ten ordinary announcements and no scripts in our check. Shops are back to trusting whatever that server sends. A remote feed printed with admin rights was a risk long before Sunday; it just didn’t have a date attached.

It was the weekend’s second case of trusted code turning on the sites that load it. A day later, on 16 November, a hijacked Optimizely snippet served a card skimmer to visitors of 178 organisations’ websites.

What Shop Owners Should Do Now

Step
How
Why
Empty the news table first
Before anyone opens the admin area: export the table if you want to keep evidence, then run TRUNCATE TABLE newsfeed; in phpMyAdmin
If your shop loaded the feed on 15 November, the code is still in that table and runs every time the admin start page opens.
Install the security fixes
The package for your exact version (1.06 to 3.3.0) from the info page, or the full 3.3.0 download with the fixes built in
The team lists it as the second step. It also covers the attacks on older versions it reported on 12 November.
New admin passwords
Every admin account, not only yours
The injected code ran with the rights of whoever was logged in.
Lock the admin folder
Password protection for the admin directory (.htaccess), usually a few clicks in your hosting panel
An admin account someone else created is useless to them if they can’t reach the login page.
Admin accounts and rights
Look for accounts or permissions you didn’t set up
A new admin account is the simplest way back in after a password change.
Payment settings and email addresses
Every active payment module (bank details for advance payment, PayPal and other provider settings) and the shop’s sender and contact addresses
A changed IBAN sends customers’ money elsewhere; a changed email address diverts orders and password resets.
New or changed files
Compare the server with the original package, especially the export folder
The team’s 12 November notice named unusual PHP files in the export directory as a sign of attack.
Customer data and the GDPR
If customer data may have been reached: report to your data protection authority within 72 hours of finding out (Art. 33), tell customers if the risk to them is high (Art. 34)
The admin area shows customer names, addresses, emails and orders, and IBANs where direct debit is on.
Do the first row before anything else. The steps close the doors the injected code could have opened; they don’t prove your shop was untouched.
Sources: modified eCommerce incident notice (updated 17 November 2026, 12:13 CET) and its 12 November security notice; GDPR Articles 33 and 34. Checked 17 November 2026.

Not sure whether anyone opened the admin area during the window? Your web server’s access log is the quickest answer. Look for requests to the admin folder on 15 November between 13:24 and 14:59 UTC (14:24 to 15:59 German time; logs may use either). Hosts keep these logs for a limited time, so check soon.

If any check turns something up, treat the shop as compromised. The team’s own 12 November notice says a fix package doesn’t clean a shop that’s already been taken over. Back up files, database and logs, then have the whole shop examined. Change the database and FTP passwords too. Tools in the admin area can put files on the server, and a planted PHP file can read the database password from the shop’s configuration.

Customer data makes this your problem under the GDPR, not only the project’s. If the code ran in your admin area, it could see what you see there. Our GDPR compliance checklist covers breach reports.

If You Buy From Small Online Shops

You usually can’t tell which shop system a store runs, and modified doesn’t publish a list of its users. Web-technology trackers find it almost only on shops in Germany, with a few in Austria and Switzerland.

Nobody has reported stolen customer data or diverted payments from this incident so far. Still, an admin session reaches customer names, addresses, email addresses and order histories, plus the bank details customers entered in shops that offer direct debit. A few habits cost nothing:

  • Paying in advance by bank transfer: compare the recipient and IBAN on your order confirmation with an earlier invoice from the same shop. If they’ve changed, ask the shop through a phone number or address you already have before you pay.
  • Emails about a recent order: expect phishing that mentions a real purchase. Your name, address and what you bought make a fake message convincing.
  • Your bank statements: watch them for direct debits you don’t recognise over the next weeks.

What We're Asking modified

We’re contacting the modified team to ask which MediaWiki flaw the attackers used, what the injected code did, how many shops downloaded the feed during the window, whether forum password hashes were taken, and whether the admin area will stop printing the feed as raw HTML.

We’ll add the answers here, along with any update to the team’s notice.

Our Mission

We believe security online security matters and its our mission to make it a safer place.