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Internet Shutdowns in 2026: Every Government Cut-Off So Far (Tracker)

Published

Miklos Zoltan

By Miklos Zoltan

Founder - PrivacyAffairs

Laura Bede

Fact-Checked this

In 20 countries, governments cut the internet or blocked major apps at some point in 2026 so far. Iran alone spent more than 100 days almost completely offline.

This page lists every government-ordered shutdown and platform block we could document between 1 January and 20 November 2026: where and when it happened, what was cut, the reason given or reported, and whether a VPN could have helped. Each entry rests on public evidence from network monitors such as Cloudflare Radar and IODA, digital rights groups such as Access Now and SFLC.in, official notices and news reports.

The yearly count of the #KeepItOn coalition arrives around March. Until then, this is the running tally for 2026, and we update it every month.

Key findings

  • 20 countries cut the internet or blocked major platforms in 2026 so far: 66 separate episodes started between 1 January and 20 November, and 8 older ones were still in force.
  • Iran was offline for more than 100 days: about three weeks during the January protests and 88 days from the start of the war on 28 February. Access since then is slowed and tiered.
  • Exam cheating is still a reason to switch off a country: Iraq did it at least 34 times, Sudan 10 times. Syria held its exams without a shutdown for the first time in at least a decade.
  • Telegram was blocked by four governments (Russia, India, Iraq and Jordan), Iraq twice.
  • A VPN would not have helped in 18 of the 66 episodes: the whole internet was off. In another 7, VPNs themselves were the target.

2026 edition, data to 20 November 2026. Next update: December 2026.

2026 so far: who cut the internet, and when

Three countries kept a shutdown running for most of the year. Myanmar’s military has held about 125 townships offline since before 2026, Russia cut mobile data somewhere almost every day, and Iran went from total blackouts to a slowed, tiered internet. India still had the most separate episodes, although its 33 shutdown orders are the fewest in a decade.

Timeline chart of internet shutdowns and platform blocks in 20 countries from 1 January to 20 November 2026, coloured by type: full cuts, mobile data cuts, whitelist or VPN blocks, and app blocks

Country
Episodes in 2026
What was cut
Still in force
Algeria
1
Platform blocks
No
Azerbaijan
1
Platform blocks
Unclear
Equatorial Guinea
1 (+1 from before 2026)
Full cuts, Platform blocks
Unclear
Ethiopia
1
Full cuts
No
Gabon
1
Platform blocks
No
Guinea
2
Platform blocks
No
India
23
Full cuts, Mobile data, Whitelist or VPN blocks, Platform blocks
No
Iran
5
Full cuts, Whitelist or VPN blocks
Yes
Iraq
4
Full cuts, Platform blocks
Yes
Jordan
2
Platform blocks
Yes
Myanmar
2 from before 2026
Full cuts, Whitelist or VPN blocks
Yes
Pakistan
10 (+1 from before 2026)
Full cuts, Mobile data, Whitelist or VPN blocks
Unclear
Philippines
1
Platform blocks
No
Republic of the Congo
1
Full cuts
No
Russia
8 (+2 from before 2026)
Mobile data, Whitelist or VPN blocks, Platform blocks
Yes
Sudan
1
Full cuts
No
Tanzania
1 from before 2026
Platform blocks
Unclear
Tunisia
2
Platform blocks
No
Uganda
2
Full cuts, Platform blocks
No
Venezuela
1 from before 2026
Platform blocks
No
An episode is one shutdown or block; a run of near-identical cuts for the same reason and place counts once (Iraq’s at least 34 exam-day cuts are one episode, as are Russia’s thousands of rotating local mobile cuts). India’s 23 episodes cover the 33 orders SFLC.in counted. “Unclear” = no report of an end, but no recent confirmation either.
Source: PrivacyAffairs analysis of public monitors, government notices and news reports, 1 January to 20 November 2026.

Every shutdown we recorded, by region

One row is one episode. Dates are in UTC. The last column says whether a VPN would have got you back online; chapter 7 explains the four cases. Our dataset has a source link for every row.

Middle East and North Africa

Country
When
Where
What was cut
Reason
VPN helps
Algeria
7–11 Jun (5 cuts)
Around 2,973 exam centres
Social media (all internet inside centres)
Exams
Usually
Iran
8–27 Jan (20 days)
Nationwide
All internet
Protests
No
Iran
27 Jan – 28 Feb (about 32 days)
Nationwide
All but approved services
Protests
Hard
Iran
16–28 Feb (13 days)
Qazvin, Ahvaz and other cities
All but the domestic intranet
Protests
No
Iran
28 Feb – 26 May (about 88 days)
Nationwide
All internet
War with US and Israel
No
Iran
since 26 May
Nationwide
Slowed, tiered access
Security
Hard
Iraq
3 Apr – 9 May (37 days)
Federal Iraq
Telegram
Armed groups, data
Usually
Iraq
20 May – 28 Sep (34 cuts)
Federal Iraq
All internet, about an hour each
Exams
No
Iraq
24 Jun – 8 Jul (5 cuts, 5 h in all)
Kurdistan Region
All internet, about an hour each
Exams
No
Iraq
since 16 Nov
Nationwide
Telegram
Illegal content
Usually
Jordan
23–30 Jul (8 days)
Around 590 exam centres
Messaging apps
Exams
Usually
Jordan
since 16 Nov
Nationwide
Telegram
Extremist content
Usually
Sudan
13–23 Apr (10 cuts, 35 h in all)
Nationwide
All internet, about 3.5 h each
Exams
No
Tunisia
3–10 Jun (6 cuts)
Mobile networks
WhatsApp, Messenger on mobile
Exams
Usually
Tunisia
29 Jun – 2 Jul (4 cuts)
Mobile networks
WhatsApp, Messenger on mobile
Exams
Usually
Source: PrivacyAffairs analysis of Cloudflare Radar, IODA, Access Now, OONI, SFLC.in, Na Svyazi, government notices and news reports; one source link per row in our dataset. Status as of 20 November 2026.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Country
When
Where
What was cut
Reason
VPN helps
Equatorial Guinea
from 20 Jul 2024
Annobón island
All internet
Protests on the island
No
Equatorial Guinea
from 2 Sep
Nationwide
Facebook, TikTok
Viral corruption video
Usually
Ethiopia
25 Sep – 5 Oct (about 10 days)
Tigray region
All internet
Fighting resumed
No
Gabon
17 Feb – 24 Oct (about 248 days)
Nationwide
Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, TikTok, YouTube
Strikes, “disinformation”
Usually
Guinea
15–17 Apr (about 48 h)
Nationwide
Facebook, Messenger, TikTok, YouTube
Not stated
Usually
Guinea
27 Jul – 15 Aug (about 19 days)
Nationwide
Facebook, TikTok, YouTube
Not stated
Usually
Republic of the Congo
15–17 Mar (about 60 h)
Nationwide
All internet
Election
No
Tanzania
from 20 May 2025
Nationwide
X
Protests, hacked accounts
Usually
Uganda
13–17 Jan (about 101 h)
Nationwide
All internet
Election
No
Uganda
18–26 Jan (about 8 days)
Nationwide
WhatsApp, X, Instagram, TikTok, Telegram
Election
Usually
Source: PrivacyAffairs analysis of Cloudflare Radar, IODA, Access Now, OONI, SFLC.in, Na Svyazi, government notices and news reports; one source link per row in our dataset. Status as of 20 November 2026.

Asia

Country
When
Where
What was cut
Reason
VPN helps
India
6–7 Jan (about 24 h)
Rajasthan: Hanumangarh
Mobile data
Protests
Wi-Fi works
India
10–12 Jan (about 48 h)
Tripura: Unakoti district
Mobile data
Unrest
Wi-Fi works
India
15–16 Jan (about 24 h)
Odisha: Sundargarh town
All internet
Unrest
No
India
19–24 Jan (about 110 h)
Assam: Kokrajhar, Chirang
Mobile data
Unrest
Wi-Fi works
India
22–30 Jan (about 8 days)
J&K: parts of Kishtwar
Mobile data
Security
Wi-Fi works
India
10–11 Feb (about 24 h)
Rajasthan: Tibbi
All internet
Protests
No
India
10–13 Feb (4 days (2 orders))
Manipur: Ukhrul and nearby areas
All internet
Unrest
No
India
1–6 Mar (about 119 h)
J&K: Kashmir Valley
Mobile data
Protests
Wi-Fi works
India
10–18 Mar (9 days (2 orders))
Meghalaya: all five Garo Hills districts
Mobile data
Election
Wi-Fi works
India
7–18 Apr (11 days (5 orders))
Manipur: five valley districts
All internet
Conflict
Hard
India
13–14 Apr (about 24 h)
J&K: Ramban district
Mobile data
Unrest
Wi-Fi works
India
17–27 Apr (11 days)
Assam: Kokrajhar, Chirang
Mobile data
Unrest
Wi-Fi works
India
29–30 May (about 22 h)
Haryana: part of Faridabad
Mobile data
Security
Wi-Fi works
India
6–8 Jun (3 days)
Rajasthan: north and east Jaipur
Mobile data
Security
Wi-Fi works
India
16–22 Jun (7 days)
Nationwide
Telegram
Exam paper leaks
Usually
India
21 Jun (about 12 h)
Uttarakhand: Rudraprayag, Karnaprayag
All internet
Unrest
No
India
8–9 Jul (about 24 h)
Rajasthan: Gangapur City area
Mobile data
Unrest
Wi-Fi works
India
17–21 Jul (5 days)
J&K: Doda district
All internet
Protests
No
India
20–25 Jul (6 days (5 orders))
Delhi: around Jantar Mantar
Mobile data
Protests
Wi-Fi works
India
24–26 Jul (about 46 h)
Bihar: Muzaffarpur
About 24 social and messaging apps
Protests
Usually
India
28–30 Sep (about 52 h)
Punjab: Phagwara university area
All internet
Protests
No
India
2–10 Oct (9 days (2 orders))
Delhi: central Delhi
Mobile data
Protests
Wi-Fi works
India
1–3 Nov (about 36 h)
Arunachal Pradesh: Upper Siang, Siang
Mobile data
Protests
Wi-Fi works
Myanmar
since 31 Jan 2022
About 125 townships
All internet
Conflict
No
Myanmar
from 1 Sep 2025
Nationwide
News sites, social media, VPNs
Election
Hard
Pakistan
from 22 Dec 2025
Nationwide
Unregistered VPNs
VPN licensing
Hard
Pakistan
from 29 Jan
KP: Lower South Waziristan
Mobile data
Security
Wi-Fi works
Pakistan
31 Jan – 5 Feb (6 days)
Balochistan: Quetta and 3 districts
Mobile data
Conflict
Wi-Fi works
Pakistan
1–12 Mar (12 days)
Gilgit-Baltistan: Skardu
All internet
Protests
No
Pakistan
from 23 Mar
Balochistan: most districts
Mobile data
Security
Wi-Fi works
Pakistan
from 5 Jun
Azad Kashmir
Broadband 99 days, mobile data longer
Protests
No
Pakistan
23–26 Jun (4 days)
All four provinces, local
Mobile data
Muharram security
Wi-Fi works
Pakistan
16–29 Jul (14 days)
KP: Bannu district
Mobile data
Conflict
Wi-Fi works
Pakistan
from 9 Aug
Balochistan: Quetta and others
Mobile data
Security
Wi-Fi works
Pakistan
26–27 Sep (2 days)
Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Attock
Mobile data
Protests
Wi-Fi works
Pakistan
from 11 Oct
KP: Peshawar and 4 more districts
All internet
Unrest
No
Philippines
23–24 Sep (2 days)
Nationwide
Discord
School shootings
Usually
Source: PrivacyAffairs analysis of Cloudflare Radar, IODA, Access Now, OONI, SFLC.in, Na Svyazi, government notices and news reports; one source link per row in our dataset. Status as of 20 November 2026.

Europe, Central Asia and the Americas

Country
When
Where
What was cut
Reason
VPN helps
Azerbaijan
from 12 Oct
Nationwide
TikTok, Instagram, X
Hijab-ban protests
Usually
Russia
since 5 May 2025
Most regions, in rotation
Mobile data (approved sites often work)
Drone threat
Hard
Russia
since 1 Sep 2025
Most regions
Mobile data except approved sites
Drone threat
Hard
Russia
since 10 Feb
Nationwide
Telegram
Law compliance
Usually
Russia
since 11 Feb
Nationwide
WhatsApp
Law compliance
Usually
Russia
since 12 Feb
Nationwide
YouTube
Law compliance
Usually
Russia
since 17 Feb
Nationwide
VPN protocols and services
Blocking VPNs
Hard
Russia
5–24 Mar (about 19 days)
Moscow
Mobile data, then approved sites only
Drone threat
Hard
Russia
from 9 Mar
St Petersburg, Leningrad region
Mobile data, approved sites only
Drone threat
Hard
Russia
since 15 Apr
Nationwide
Big Russian sites refuse VPN users
Blocking VPNs
Hard
Russia
4–9 May (6 days)
Moscow, St Petersburg, Perm
Mobile data
Victory Day security
Wi-Fi works
Venezuela
8 Aug 2024 – 25 Jun 2026 (687 days)
Nationwide
X
Post-election dispute
Usually
Source: PrivacyAffairs analysis of Cloudflare Radar, IODA, Access Now, OONI, SFLC.in, Na Svyazi, government notices and news reports; one source link per row in our dataset. Status as of 20 November 2026.

Why governments cut the internet in 2026

Protests and unrest were behind 26 of the 66 episodes that started this year, more than any other reason. Delhi switched off mobile data seven times, every time against the same youth movement. Azad Kashmir in Pakistan lost broadband for 99 days after a protest march in June, and mobile data for even longer. Azerbaijan blocked TikTok, Instagram and X in October, while protests against a school hijab ban were growing.

Elections come next on the list of usual suspects. Uganda’s communications regulator ordered the internet off on 13 January, two days before the presidential vote; it came back after about 101 hours, but social media stayed blocked until 26 January. The Republic of the Congo went dark for about 60 hours during its own presidential election in March, without any official explanation.

War and “security” account for the longest cuts. Iran’s wartime blackout lasted 88 days. Tigray in Ethiopia lost all connectivity for about 10 days when fighting resumed in late September, and who ordered it is disputed. Russia cuts mobile data under the pretext of drone attacks, and Pakistan did the same in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa during military operations, and across all four provinces during Muharram.

Then there are the exams. Iraq switched the whole country off at least 34 times this year so that pupils could not share answers, according to Access Now, and Sudan did it 10 times in April. Syria, a regular on this list, held its 2026 exams without a shutdown for the first time in at least a decade, and Algeria limited its blocks to the area around exam centres. So it can be done: the exams took place, and the internet stayed on.

The last group is about content. Telegram was blocked by four governments this year: Russia, India (for a week before a re-run medical entrance exam), Jordan and Iraq, which blocked it in April and again from 16 November. Gabon suspended social networks for eight months, from 17 February to 24 October, while its media regulator demanded better moderation from the platforms.

A government that switches off the internet to calm a protest rarely gets calm. It does get a population that cannot pay a bill, reach a doctor online or tell anyone what happened.

Iran: the longest nationwide shutdown on record

Iran cut the global internet on the evening of 8 January as protests spread, and traffic stayed near zero until about 21 January, Cloudflare measured. What followed was not a reopening. From late January, only approved services worked and most platforms and many VPNs failed.

On 28 February, the day US and Israeli airstrikes began, the country went dark again. Only the National Information Network, Iran’s domestic intranet, kept working. On 5 April NetBlocks called it the longest nation-scale shutdown on record in any country. On 14 April the government unveiled “Internet Pro”, unfiltered access for state bodies and authorised businesses, while everyone else stayed on the intranet, as IODA documented.

Access returned from 26 May, after 88 days, and it returned selectively. Traffic settled at about 59% of its pre-shutdown level. In October the government spokeswoman, Fatemeh Mohajerani, said state bodies slow the internet on purpose, and using Starlink is punishable by six months to two years in prison, Al Jazeera reported. It is not often that a censor confirms the obvious in a press conference.

Russia: thousands of local cuts, and an internet with a guest list

Russia does not switch the country off. It switches off mobile data, region by region, sometimes street by street, and it has done so almost daily since May 2025. The official reason is the threat of Ukrainian drones. The monitoring project Na Svyazi, using data from Monitor Runeta, counted 20,218 partial regional cuts in the year to 5 May 2026. Nizhny Novgorod and Rostov had the most, just ahead of Moscow, Saratov and Sverdlovsk.

Moscow got its first long cut on 5 March. Mobile internet in large parts of the city stayed down until about 24 March, and St Petersburg followed within days, Human Rights Watch reported. In February a new law obliged operators to suspend service at the request of the FSB.

During most cuts, a whitelist of approved services keeps working: government portals, banks, big Russian shops and taxi apps. In July, 69.5% of mobile sessions in central Russia and nearly 90% in the regions bordering Ukraine could reach only whitelisted services, according to Vigo data reported by Kommersant. In whitelist mode the mobile internet works, as long as you only want what the state has already approved.

The platforms went too. Russia’s regulator blocked WhatsApp in February, and by 10 April 95% of OONI’s tests showed Telegram blocked, Meduza reported. VPNs are under pressure from two sides: common protocols are blocked, and since mid-April more than 20 big Russian services refuse users who connect through a VPN at all.

In our tables, the rotating mobile cuts are one episode, because counting them one by one is not possible from public sources. If we counted every local cut, Russia alone would outnumber the rest of the world.

Why the trackers count differently

Ask four trackers how many shutdowns there were this year and you get four different numbers. None of them is wrong; they count different things.

Tracker
What it counts
Latest figure
Access Now #KeepItOn
Every shutdown and platform block, one per order or period, from many sources
313 in 52 countries in 2025 (record); the 2026 count is due around March 2027
Internet Society Pulse
Only cuts backed by technical data; regional and national cuts, service blocks
978 since 2019
Cloudflare Radar
Traffic drops on its own network, with the cause where known
49 disruptions in Q3 2026, 19 of them ordered by governments
SFLC.in (India)
Each Indian shutdown order
33 in 2026 to 9 November, the fewest in a decade
Na Svyazi (Russia)
Each partial regional mobile cut
20,218 from 5 May 2025 to 5 May 2026
This page
Episodes, with repeated cuts grouped
66 started in 2026, plus 8 older ones still in force
Sources: Access Now (31 March 2026), Internet Society Pulse (checked 21 November 2026), Cloudflare (27 October 2026), Newslaundry citing SFLC.in (16 November 2026), Na Svyazi (May 2026).

Access Now’s count is the highest because it records every order and every platform block, with input from local partners. The Internet Society’s Pulse tracker adds a shutdown only when it has specific technical data, so its list is shorter. Cloudflare sees drops in its own traffic, which works best for national blackouts and less well for a single district. National monitors such as SFLC.in in India and Na Svyazi in Russia go deepest in one country.

So when a headline says “a record year”, check who counted and what. A record by one method can be an average year by another.

Can a VPN get you around a shutdown?

Sometimes. It depends on what was cut, and in 2026 the answer was “no” more often than VPN marketing would suggest.

The whole internet is off
A VPN needs a connection to work, so it cannot help. Only satellite internet or leaving the area does, and satellite can be illegal (in Iran, using Starlink can mean prison).
18 of the 66 episodes that started in 2026, in 8 countries.
Only mobile data is off
Wi-Fi and fixed broadband usually keep working, so the fix is a different network, not a VPN.
22 episodes.
Some apps or sites are blocked
This is where a VPN usually works, as long as the VPN itself is not blocked. Have it installed before the block: app stores and VPN websites are often blocked with the platforms.
19 episodes.
VPNs are targeted, or only approved sites work
Plain VPN protocols get detected. Services with obfuscation, or Tor with bridges, have better odds, but whitelist mode can defeat them all.
7 episodes, in Iran, Russia, India, Pakistan and Myanmar.
Source: PrivacyAffairs classification of the 66 episodes that started between 1 January and 20 November 2026.

What helps, in order of how often it works:

  • Install before you need it. App stores and VPN websites are usually blocked together with the platforms. A VPN with obfuscation has better odds where VPNs are hunted, and a second one is a sensible backup.
  • Tor Browser with bridges. The Snowflake and obfs4 bridges disguise the connection; our Tor guide shows how to set them up.
  • Avoid the free apps that flood the stores during a shutdown. Some log or sell what passes through them, as we explain in the dark side of free VPNs.
  • For mobile-only cuts, switch networks. Wi-Fi at home, work or a café usually keeps working.
  • For a full cut, think offline. Offline maps downloaded in advance, and messaging apps such as Briar that work over Bluetooth and Wi-Fi without the internet, cover short distances. Calls and SMS sometimes survive a data shutdown.

Check the local law first. In some countries, using a VPN, a Tor bridge or a satellite terminal can bring a fine or a prison sentence, and that risk is yours, not the app’s.

How we built this list, and its limits

What counts. We follow the #KeepItOn coalition’s definition: an intentional disruption of the internet or of electronic communications that makes them inaccessible or unusable for a population or in a place. That covers full shutdowns, mobile data cuts, whitelist regimes and blocks of major social, messaging and video platforms ordered by a government or another authority.

What does not. Power cuts, cable breaks, storms, cyberattacks, single websites and AI apps (Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines blocked the Grok chatbot in January), and long-standing censorship such as China’s. A block that began before 2026 is included when it was still in force this year; there are 8 such rows.

Sources. Our research on 21 November 2026 went through Cloudflare’s quarterly disruption reports, IODA, OONI, Access Now statements, SFLC.in, Na Svyazi, government notices and news reports, country by country. Every row has at least one source link in the dataset, and we checked the facts behind the key findings by hand against their sources. The Internet Society’s Pulse tracker helped us find events, but every row also rests on a source other than Pulse, and we do not republish Pulse or Cloudflare data.

Episodes. A run of near-identical cuts for the same reason in the same place counts as one episode, with the number of cuts in the dataset. India’s 33 orders became 23 episodes, Iraq’s exam cuts one.

Limits. Local cuts that nobody reports are invisible to us, as they are to everyone. For 12 episodes no end date has been reported, and the dataset marks them as such. Some reasons are the official ones, which are not always the real ones.

Updates and corrections. We update the page every month and add new episodes as monitors confirm them. Found an error or a missing shutdown? Write to us with a source.

Dataset. Download the CSV (74 rows, one per episode, with dates, places, what was cut, reason, status, VPN class, source links and our confidence level). How to cite: PrivacyAffairs, “Internet Shutdowns in 2026: Every Government Cut-Off So Far”, updated 21 November 2026, https://www.privacyaffairs.com/internet-shutdowns/.

Using this research
Journalists, researchers and teachers are welcome to use the findings and our dataset. Please credit PrivacyAffairs and link to this page.
Did we miss a shutdown, or get one wrong? Write to [email protected] with a source. We answer within one working day and add a dated correction note when a fact changes, as our Editorial Policy says.

Frequently Asked Questions

Some people found answers to these questions helpful

How many internet shutdowns have there been in 2026?

We counted 66 episodes that started between 1 January and 20 November 2026, in 17 countries, plus 8 older shutdowns or blocks that were still in force; 20 countries in all. Trackers that count each order separately get higher numbers. Access Now's full-year figure for 2026 is expected around March 2027.


Which country had the longest internet shutdown in 2026?

Iran. Its wartime blackout lasted 88 days, from 28 February to 26 May, and NetBlocks called it the longest nation-scale shutdown on record. Together with about three weeks in January, Iran was almost fully offline for more than 100 days this year.


Why do governments shut down the internet during exams?

To stop leaked exam papers and answers from spreading on messaging apps. In 2026 Iraq did it at least 34 times and Sudan 10 times; Syria stopped, and Algeria and Jordan limited their blocks to the area around exam centres.


Can a VPN bypass an internet shutdown?

Only if some internet is left. A VPN usually gets around blocked apps and websites, but it cannot help when all connectivity is cut, and in Russia, Iran, Pakistan and Myanmar VPNs themselves are blocked. For mobile-only cuts, Wi-Fi is the simpler fix.


What is a whitelist shutdown?

A cut where the internet keeps working only for services the state has approved, such as government portals and banks. Russia uses it during most mobile cuts, and Iran used a similar approved-list regime between its two blackouts.


How often is this tracker updated?

Every month. Each update adds newly confirmed episodes, closes the ones that ended and moves the date at the top of the page.