Skip to content

Original privacy and security research, news and free tools since 2018, cited by the FBI, CISA and the World Economic Forum See our research

Cited by the FBI, CISA and the World Economic Forum

News

GL.iNet Owners Find a Second Backdoor on Their Routers, Some Planted in 2025

Published

Miklos Zoltan

By Miklos Zoltan

Founder - PrivacyAffairs

Laura Bede

Fact-Checked this

Owners checking their GL.iNet routers for Friday’s cloud attack have found a separate, older backdoor, on some routers since the autumn of 2025.

It isn’t in GL.iNet’s security notice of 20 November, and the check GL.iNet tells owners to run doesn’t find it. It starts with the router, reports to servers named to look like AdGuard and OpenWrt, and survives firmware updates that keep the settings.

The scale is not small. RemoteToHome Consulting, which sets up GL.iNet VPN routers for remote workers, says it found the backdoor installed and running on 47 of the 183 routers it has checked since Saturday. On Sunday morning, a GL.iNet staff member listed it among the reports the company is looking at, without saying more.

When we published, the find had been discussed only on GL.iNet’s forum and in two community projects on GitHub. We found no news coverage. Our report on the 20 November incident covers the cloud attack itself.

What Owners Found

The first report came at 21:34 UTC on Saturday. An owner looking for traces of Friday’s attack on three routers found something else on a GL-AX1800 used as an access point. By Sunday morning, owners of a GL-X2000, a GL-MT3000, a Puli AX (GL-XE3000) and another GL-AX1800 had posted the same files.

Their reports agree on how it works.

  • It starts with the router. Extra lines at the top of the start-up script /etc/init.d/urandom_seed copy the router’s own Lua interpreter to /usr/bin/monitord and use it to run /bin/ulogd, a compiled Lua program.
  • It reports in. The program restarts the system log, then sends the router’s serial number, MAC address, model, firmware version and DDNS name to its server, without checking the server’s certificate. The samples posted call home every two hours; one waited three days between calls.
  • It takes orders. The server can send back a second program, which runs as ujaild from a temporary file that deletes itself. Owners who took it apart found code for tunnels and a SOCKS5 proxy. The first owner’s analysis says it lets the server’s operator run any command, open a terminal and send their own traffic through your connection or into your home network.
  • It stays. On most infected routers it adds both files to the list a firmware update keeps (/lib/upgrade/keep.d/netifd), so an update with “Keep settings” on carries it over. One owner says it survived an April 2026 upgrade that way.

Every router carries its own build of /bin/ulogd. The community’s reports show 41 different hashes on 41 routers, so a list of known file hashes won’t find it. On three routers, the WireGuard server configuration was rewritten 11 seconds after the backdoor’s files appeared. One owner compared it with a backup and found the content unchanged, which looks like the trace of an automated installer.

Since When

On the 38 routers whose clocks gave a real date, RemoteToHome found the files dated between 15 September 2025 and 24 May 2026, arriving in batches. On 20 December 2025 the backdoor reached 11 routers on 11 different networks, six of them within 14 minutes.

File dates can be faked. The community member who maintains the main detection script warns that the attacker sets them to the firmware’s build date to blend in. One owner’s weekly backups say otherwise for one router. The files were absent on 28 December 2025, present on 4 January 2026, and stamped 1 January 2026, 05:35 UTC.

The backdoor’s server names point the same way. We looked up the registration records of all five. The first two were bought on 4 July 2025, eight minutes apart, at two different registrars, and put behind the same pair of Cloudflare name servers; a third followed on 18 August. The older loader (files from September 2025) calls those three, the newer one (from December 2025) two adguardns domains registered on 8 December 2025.

Server name
Registered
Loader
lede-openproject.org
4 Jul 2025
Older
adxinsight.com
4 Jul 2025
Older
openwrt-project.org
18 Aug 2025
Older
adguardns.com
8 Dec 2025
Newer
adguardns.org
8 Dec 2025
Newer
The backdoor calls the cdn. and up. names under these domains. They imitate AdGuard and OpenWrt, whose own sites are adguard.com and openwrt.org.
Sources: domain registry records (RDAP) and DNS, checked November 22, 2026, 15:14 UTC; which loader calls which name: samples decoded by owners on GL.iNet’s forum.

Spreading the names over three registrars and three sets of name servers means one takedown doesn’t cut the backdoor off. All five still resolved to Cloudflare addresses when we checked at 15:14 UTC on Sunday.

A backdoor reporting to a fake AdGuard server is a particular insult on routers whose admin panel offers AdGuard Home for blocking trackers.

How It Got In Is Unknown

Nobody has found the installer yet. What the reports have in common is GL.iNet’s cloud service, GoodCloud. Every infected router described so far was bound to it.

RemoteToHome adds detail from the routers it manages. Of the 47 infected ones, 42 have no public address, so they can’t be reached from the internet directly. Each of the 36 it could check was bound to GoodCloud before the backdoor arrived and ran a build of the cloud client newer than the one in which the flaw used on Friday first appears. The community advisory reads that as pointing to the cloud as the way in. GL.iNet hasn’t confirmed it.

If the cloud was the way in, the abuse began more than a year before GL.iNet says it found the flaw.

Not every GoodCloud router was hit. A second GL-AX1800 with the same firmware, also bound to GoodCloud, was clean, and one owner’s infected GL-MT3000 had GoodCloud’s remote SSH and web access switched off.

Most infected routers run firmware 4.7.x or 4.8.x, though RemoteToHome also found the backdoor on one router with 4.9.0 and one with 4.11.0. Brume 2 routers (GL-MT2500) stand out, with 18 of the 32 infected devices in the script’s anonymous reports and 17 of the 19 RemoteToHome checked. Their newest stable firmware on GL.iNet’s server is 4.7.4, from March 2025.

What GL.iNet Has Said

Very little so far. The notice, last updated on 21 November, describes only the 20 November attack and gives one sign of infection, a process named crond -i /tmp/.log. The older backdoor doesn’t create it.

On Sunday at 08:11 UTC, a GL.iNet staff member listed three cases found in the forum and in the community’s script. The third is “an older backdoor associated with changes to the urandom_seed startup script and processes named monitord or ujaild.” The post asks a forum member to confirm the list and says nothing about cause, scope or dates.

GL.iNet promised stable router firmware with security fixes for 22 November. At 15:15 UTC on Sunday, its firmware server listed no new stable build for any of the ten router models we checked.

How to Check Your Router

GL.iNet’s own check (ps | grep tmp) won’t show this backdoor. Over SSH, run these three:

  • /rom/bin/busybox cmp /etc/init.d/urandom_seed /rom/etc/init.d/urandom_seed compares the start-up script with the firmware’s own copy. No output means they match.
  • ls -l /bin/ulogd /usr/bin/monitord should answer “No such file or directory” for both.
  • ps | grep -e monitord -e ujaild should show only the grep line itself.

If you run AdGuard Home on the router, search its query log for adguardns, lede-openproject, adxinsight and openwrt-project. A hit means some device on your network asked for one of the names; the log doesn’t say which device is infected.

The community script maintained by a forum moderator checks for these signs and for the 20 November ones. He doesn’t work for GL.iNet, and GL.iNet hasn’t reviewed the script. It reports the older backdoor but doesn’t remove it.

If You Find It

  • Reflash, don’t just reset. Install the firmware again from a file you downloaded yourself, with “Keep settings” off, and set the router up by hand instead of restoring a backup. RemoteToHome advises a reflash over a factory reset, because on most routers it tested, root can write to the image a reset restores from.
  • Assume every secret on it was copied. Change the Wi-Fi, admin, DDNS and GoodCloud passwords. Delete the router’s WireGuard or OpenVPN profile with your VPN provider and create a new one. If the router runs a WireGuard server, give it new keys and issue new client profiles.
  • Block the five names in your network’s DNS, or on whatever resolver your devices use.
  • Switch GoodCloud off if you don’t need remote management, and check again after every update. One owner found that an online upgrade to 4.11.0 with settings kept switched GoodCloud and its remote access back on.
  • Report it to [email protected] with the model, firmware version and file dates.

We're Contacting GL.iNet

We’re asking GL.iNet whether it knew of the older backdoor before Saturday, how it got onto the routers and whether GoodCloud was the way in, since when it has been installed and on how many devices. We’re also asking whether the new firmware removes it, including the entry in the keep list, whether the notice and the official check will be updated, whether affected customers will be told, and whether the company is working to have the five server names taken down.

We’ll update this article when GL.iNet replies.

How we report

We check claims against primary sources, ask the companies involved for comment and never publish personal data from a leak.

Our reporting has been cited by the FBI and CISA, Tom’s Hardware, PC Gamer, TechRepublic and the Financial Post.

Spotted an error or have a tip? Email [email protected] — we reply within one working day.

Who cites us